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Abstract I examine some topics concerning 
knowledge management through the activities of the 
factory of the Dutch East India Company in Japan. I use 
Dutch archival materials to show the movement from 
the tacit dimension of knowledge to concrete, written 
forms. I focus not only on the collection of data, but also 
on the methods of dissemination and usage of the 
collected information, and the connection between these 
dimension and the organizational structure of the 
Company. 
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The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was a new actor 
in Asia at the beginning of the 17th century, and this 
fact left its mark on its stock of available knowledge. 
However, the 1620s and the 1630s brought significant 
transformation of Dutch navigational knowledge. The 
European side of management of Dutch navigational 
knowledge touching Asia in the 17–18th century (that is 
the activities of the Hydrographic Office of the VOC) is 
well  known  from  the  thorough  study  of  Günter  Schilder  
(1976). Kees Zandvliet (2002) provides a similarly 
exciting review of the activities of Asian hubs of the 
VOC. His text, besides allowing insight into the work of 
the cartographic workshop in the primary Dutch base, 
Batavia, details the role of a mid-level centre, Taiwan, 
too, in completing such tasks. At the same time much 
less data is available on the bottom levels. My paper 
intends to improve the situation in this respect and as 
such it is basically a case study. My main emphasis is 
on the role of a unit at the lower part of the 
organizational hierarchy in handling navigational 
information: I examine what part the VOC-factory in 
Japan played in a special segment of the information 
management of the Company.  
II. METHODS 
A. Primary Aims 
Work in factories and on ships included different 
information-related activities, therefore the 
simultaneous examination of these two spheres can shed 
light on both general topics – such as the various sides 
of information handling – and on such concrete and 
individual historical details that have not received 
enough attention. On the one side, I implement a 
problem-centred approach. This provides wonderful 
opportunity   to   detail   some   “timeless”   problems   (and  
especially their manifestations) that appeared in most 
historical eras. I will examine such topics like the 
expansion of the pool of information available to actors 
(mainly its coordination) or the multiplication, 
dissemination and sharing of information collected and 
“shaped   into   proper   form”.   The   events,   for   example,  
show perfectly how different stations of the knowledge 
handling process were based on each other: starting with 
a problem and the birth of an idea, through the 
collection of data, up to dissemination of acquired 
information in the system. Such examination may show 
how these issues took shape in the early modern era, 
how they were answered, and may even serve as raw 
material for a broader research on the history of 
information-related phenomena.  
At the same time, I try to give better insight into 
some minute details of the information system of the 
VOC. The profound examination of the Japan factory 
helps with this, since it reveals additional tiny 
particulars of Dutch presence in Asia. A description of 
the Japanese situation highlights how specific the Dutch 
information-system could be in different regions and 
allows some comparisons. For instance, Zandvliet 
(1998) applied a well-structured model on Dutch 
cartographic activities on Taiwan. However, the 
chronological stages described in his paper were based 
largely on Dutch military power exercised there. The 
situation was fundamentally different in Japan. The 
Dutch had no similar power in Japan at all, and this 
characteristic made a fundamental impact on specifics 
related to navigational and cartographic knowledge, too. 
To sum it up: my other aim is to present one – slightly 
special – of the many faces of the information-system of 
the Dutch Company. This can be all the more important, 
because such an analysis allows highlighting and 
emphasising many not trade-related activities in this 
Dutch factory, too. 
Last, one terminological issue should be mentioned. 
I try to focus not only on cartographic knowledge 
(though probably this is the most concrete and obvious 
portion of the stock of knowledge in question), but on a 
slightly different category: navigational knowledge. I 
lay bigger emphasis especially on the unwritten – 
accordingly, in the sources often invisible – dimension. 
Within this, I will try mainly to grab the role of 
“experience”,  which  – despite of the constant expansion 
of cartographic knowledge – had paramount importance 
even on ships of the mid-17th century. 
B. Available Sources 
Making up an idea of the role played by the Japan 
factory in its first one and a half decades concerning 
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cartographic and navigational matters, due to lack of 
primary sources, is a difficult task. The majority of the 
Dutch correspondence is still available in the archives, 
but before 1625 it has very big gaps, and there are 
hardly any available sources for the years before 1623. 
The majority of the letters that can be consulted today 
was written after that year. Between 1629 and 1633 
there was another nadir, but this was the result of a 
temporary deterioration of Dutch–Japanese relations 
(the so called Nuyts-affair, a serious clash with Japanese 
authorities). However, after this period a huge corpus of 
sources –supported even by Dagregisters held in Japan 
(1974), Taiwan and Batavia – is available. Accordingly, 
I can present a more detailed picture on the 1630s.  
III. JAPAN IN THE VOC SYSTEM  
The establishment of the VOC-factory, seated in 
Hirado, South Kyushu, in 1609 should be viewed in a 
given geopolitical constellation. It was not only a 
commercial centre: the Dutch used it mainly as a base in 
their war against Portugal and Spain. Logistic tasks of 
the factory were as important as commercial or 
economic ones. Japan played a role as a centre 
providing support for ships operating in the South China 
Sea region, and the Dutch exported much provision and 
war materials from the country. Exporting foodstuff 
from Japan and founding guns and metal accessories of 
ships played significant role in the wars of the Dutch. At 
the same time, the country was used as a base for 
military (often privateering) operations. It played an 
equally important role in careening ships, and only the 
Nuyts-affair altered this.  
 Things started to change in the 1620s. The 
factory in Hirado slowly transformed into a fundamental 
element of the Dutch – especially intra-Asian – 
commercial system. First, Japan was less and less able 
to fulfil its mentioned role as a naval base. The shogun 
in 1620 prohibited the export of weapons and Japanese 
persons, which was a severe blow to this role. 
Careening ships was no more possible in Japan around 
the end of the 1620s, and was held no more economical 
in the 1630s. On the other hand the factory became 
more and more important economically. By 1633, 
Taiwan evolved into a very important commercial 
centre, so the volume and profitability of Dutch traffic 
from Taiwan to Japan increased firmly. The other 
primary partner region was Batavia, which played 
crucial role as the headquarters of the VOC-system in 
Asia. Wares from Europe and other parts of Asia 
reached Japan usually through this town.  
IV. DUTCH CHARTING ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN 
A. A Problem to be Solved 
Emphasising   that   “experience”,   unwritten   knowledge  
was very crucial in the second half of the 1620s seems 
to be a good starting point. Sources before 1625 contain 
only few mentions on maps of Japan, though this of 
course does not mean that maps or navigational aids 
were completely missing. This relative absence of 
references rather suggests that – in this period at least – 
only few difficulties or questions to be solved arose 
concerning such written aids. There are many more 
references to experience-related issues. The phrase 
“experienced   pilot”   appears   many   times,   usually   in   a  
context describing how desperately such experts were 
needed. If we try to specify the underlying meaning of 
the term, it seems probable that the authors of these 
letters   comprehended   “experience”   as   tangible  
knowledge relating to a more or less definable region 
and to specific details of the area in question. That is, 
experience meant acquaintance with concrete situations 
and  issues  “around  here”,  in  a  given  territory.   
The question of experience, however, most often 
appears in a different way: through references to 
inexperience (that is lack of experience) and difficulties 
resulting from that want. The need for experienced 
specialists in Japan became more and more imperative, 
especially after the middle of the 1620s. While in the 
first decade of the factory there were even such years 
when no ship arrived at Japan at all, in the middle of the 
1630s usually 7-8 Dutch ships visited Japan in a year, 
and in the end of the decade this number stayed steadily 
above ten. This was of course happy news from the 
viewpoint of trade, but these ships had to be manned 
with experts having the necessary knowledge (that is of 
Japanese waters) to conduct these voyages. This did not 
go smoothly at all. Another – Japan-specific – factor 
made the situation especially serious. An edict of the 
shogun prohibited local barks to meet Dutch ships 
arriving at Japanese coasts. The order may have caused 
serious confusion above all because Dutch ships seem to 
have used local experts extensively as guides. Open 
water navigation was more or less a routine and was 
supported by charts and rutters as well, attention 
especially was required when ships reached their target 
region. The exact locations of the places sought or safe 
havens had to be found on the – not necessary familiar – 
coastline; possibly dangerous parts or currents had to be 
avoided, and so on. If the pilot of a ship had not ever 
visited Japan and was not acquainted with the region, 
the  result  could  easily  be  a  series  of  “inconveniences”. 
We find many references on difficulties originating 
from lack of proper navigational knowledge. Sometimes 
even reaching Hirado could be a serious challenge. In 
1634, for instance, the navigators of the Venloo and the 
Schaagen, who had not been to Japan earlier, thought 
they were in Hirado – though they reached only the 
coasts of Satsuma, which is quite far from the town. 
After reaching Hirado calling at port still could be a 
challenge. Not only an underwater reef made this task 
difficult, but a strong current in the bay, too. They got a 
ship into a serious jeopardy in 1627, which grounded on 
some clips of rock. The writer of the letter describing 
the incident held it important to highlight that neither 
the commander of the ship nor the navigator had visited 
Japan earlier, thus they did not know the place.  
B. Possible Answers 
So, dangerous emergencies originating from lack of 
experience were not at all rare even in the 1630s, 
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despite of the fact that the Dutch factory had a past of a 
quarter of a century by then. Dutch decision-makers 
noticed these problems. They could consider many ways 
to   improve   the   situation.   “Teaching”   specialists and 
endowing them with the necessary knowledge presented 
itself as an obvious solution. Considering the nature of 
the task, this could happen mainly through practice. For 
example, in 1625 the cape merchant sent an 
“experienced”   pilot   to   Taiwan   on   board of a Japanese 
ship. The cape merchant charged the pilot with taking 
good notice on every detail, and after reaching Taiwan 
he had to give an account to the Governor there. This 
kind of learning, however, was not a consistent strategy. 
“Lending”   pilots does not seem a completely unique 
practice in these early years, but such situations more 
often were taken as inconveniences, so had to be 
avoided. 
The situation could be improved (instead of getting 
more information) with bettering the distribution of 
available knowledge, too. In practice it meant that 
specialists with necessary expertise were stationed in 
primary centres, visited ships in distress if necessity 
required, and guided them to safety. On Taiwan sending 
out ships to meet those that just were arriving from 
Batavia or Japan was a regular practice. The Hirado 
factory, too, got such experts in the 1630s. The two 
most famous were Frans Visscher and Matthijs Quast. 
Nevertheless, none of them were especially sent to 
Japan to solve such situations, but had different 
assignments. 
These methods, however, were not perfect, and 
could not be used for a longer term. Teaching specialists 
through sending them on voyages required very much 
time and resources; moving experts was slow, and there 
were never enough of them around. Finally, the most 
perfect   solution   was   “untying”   knowledge   from  
individuals, and making it accessible on material 
carriers. 
Demands on new maps appear in the second half of 
the 1620s first. The head of the Hirado factory 
highlighted the problem detailed above first in 1627. 
The letter contains several interesting details. The 
mentioned edict of the shogun, which prohibited local 
barks to meet arriving Dutch ships, explains the exact 
timing of raising the problem. The Dutch practice of 
relying on local people – an effective method at first 
sight – gives a reason why the Dutch had not made any 
effort at all to reconnoitre the coasts of Kyushu and why 
such an expedition had not even been suggested at all. 
Besides, it accounts for the detail why the Japan factory 
advised the project. The merchant – as a reaction to the 
new situation – suggested sending a navigator to Japan 
to survey the broader neighbourhood of Hirado 
(concretely the regions of the Goto Islands, Arima and 
Satsuma). He argued that the project did not involve 
heavy expenses, since only one person had to be sent 
over. This supports again the idea that the ignorance of 
making detailed charts was not due to financial reasons. 
However, the proposal – mainly as a consequence of the 
Japanese-Dutch conflict developing at the end of the 
decade – was dropped, and even a letter sent in 1634 
from Batavia refers to the region in question as 
unknown.  
 Similar plans appeared again in 1633, but this 
time different demand was in the background, so a 
different place had to be examined. In earlier years 
moving the factory from Hirado had come up several 
times. This time a special Ki no Kuni, in the vicinity of 
Osaka was brought up. Drawing a map on the place was 
not touched upon, the documents prescribed only 
“discovery”.  Parallel  with  this,  the  former  project  of  the  
collection of navigation-related data and the 
reconnaissance of the seas around Japan was not 
mentioned at all. Examination of the site finally took 
place in the beginning of 1634, but the Dutch – 
probably due to lack of shipping experts – could not 
establish if the harbour was suitable for bigger vessels 
or only for barks. Thus, satisfactory closure of the case 
was delayed. Meanwhile charting the region of Goto 
and Arima became timely again. The merchants had to 
choose between the simultaneous projects. The council 
in August judged the discovery of Ki no Kuni 
secondary, and finally in the autumn of 1634 totally 
abandoned the idea. 
 The background of the new plans to map seas 
around South Kyushu was still the same: dangers 
originating from lack of knowledge of navigators of 
ships arriving in Japan. The question was brought forth 
again only in 1634. A pilot set off in June to collect data 
on the waters near the Goto Islands and to make a map 
of the region. However, the expedition had to turn back 
after few weeks since the regents there, after getting 
acquainted with the purpose of the Dutch ship, 
commanded her to leave forthwith. The Dutch 
reluctantly returned to Hirado. Not long after this 
failure, following the urge from Batavia, another try was 
decided on. The Dutch acquired an even stronger letter 
of recommendation from the lord of Hirado. 
Nevertheless, all this was in vain. The point of view of 
the regents of Goto did not change at all. Some places, 
regardless of the rejection, were charted, so the 
enterprise was not a total failure. However, surveys 
around Goto came to an end.  
 The voyages of discovery continued, but new 
places were put in focus. In 1635 two Dutchmen 
mapped the territories and islands north of Hirado. In 
1636 steps were taken to find another port instead of 
Hirado. A bay not far was surveyed: experts finally 
visited it, drew a large-scale  map  of  it,  “took  its  depth  at  
every  point”,  but  the  results  showed  that  transferring  the 
factory to this new port would not have been an 
especially advantageous move. This was the last Dutch 
expedition in the period examined. The pilots who 
played crucial role in gathering the data soon left Japan. 
Collecting data however was only the first step of 
solving the problem. 
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D. Multiplication and Dissemination 
The   first   mention   on   the   “new   map   of   the   coasts   of  
Japan”  appeared  in  a  very  short  time  after  the  mentioned  
expeditions. A letter sent to Europe in early 1635 had 
the map of Goto attached. In the same year, this new 
map of Goto found its way back to Japan. It was even 
used during the voyage. After this, maps on South 
Kyushu regularly appear in documents. So, in the 
second half of the 1630s not only mapping expeditions 
were abundant in Japan, but – based on the information 
gathered – many maps were drawn also, especially on 
the regions that were crucial for safe coming and going 
of ships. However, one additional task still had to be 
done. The charts had to be present on all ships visiting 
Japan.  
 First of course, a number of maps had to be 
created through copying the original one. It is 
interesting that making copies did not take place 
necessarily in the cartographic workshop (in Batavia) 
and  was  not  done  by  all  means  by  professional   “chart-
makers”.   The   Japan   factory   played   significant   role   in  
copying maps, though this time not merchants, but 
officers of ships had tasks to do. In directions given to 
ships moving from Taiwan to Japan duplicating maps 
(of both Japan and Taiwan) – according one order in 3-4 
pieces – appear, that this activity was widespread in the 
second half of the 30s in the factory. They provide 
interesting contribution concerning division of labour 
also. Maps were made in Batavia, but the much more 
mechanical duplicating works were assigned to lower 
levels of the hierarchy. The Taiwan centre often sent all 
copies of a specific map to Japan, and kept none by 
itself. Copies had to be made after the original one. 
After that all copies were to be distributed among ships, 
and the source map had to be sent back to Taiwan. 
Dissemination of maps appears first in 1634, too, 
supposedly because the first new maps to be distributed 
were made then. Here some notes on the usage of maps 
are in order. Some ships reached Japan directly from 
Bantam, but many more arrived from or via Taiwan. 
Consequently, maps depicting coastlines and seas 
around China and Taiwan popped up in the factory as 
often as those of the South Japanese islands. The 
direction of movement of ships was a very important 
factor in the process of distribution. Maps of the 
destination areas were especially important, and 
navigators were provided with these immediately before 
setting off to the trip. Pilots, however, were allowed to 
keep these maps by themselves until they needed them – 
that is the termination of the voyage in question. The 
distributive actions at the Japan factory aligned to this 
structure.  
The practice of moving maps around was fixed in 
the middle of the 1630s. The first mention of maps of 
Goto, Hirado and the Japanese waters given to 
navigators is from 1635. Navigators received these 
maps in Taiwan, and – since seemingly they were not 
needed any more after successful arrival – had to hand 
down them in Japan. After that, merchants sent those 
maps back to Taiwan, in order   to   provide   next   year’s  
ships with them. At the same time, several maps of the 
China coast travelled on the ships heading for Japan, 
too, but they were handled separately. The cape 
merchant had to have made copies of them and then he 
had to distribute the new maps among ships heading for 
Taiwan. Moreover, according to indications, navigators 
had only the maps of their destinations with them. All 
other charts – which apparently were not used on the 
voyages – travelled in the batch of the general 
documents (letters, accounts etc.), usually in the custody 
of a merchant. The fact that the orders given to the cape 
merchant at Hirado always detailed and emphasised 
collection of maps of Japan, while concerning Chinese 
maps no such directions can be found, hints again that 
latter ones were not with the navigators. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The events I described are the in connection with a 
transformation of the VOC in the 1630s. This was not 
confined to cartographic issues; a background structural 
change is highly probable. Access to goods was one 
thing, but a solid information background was necessary 
to be competitive, too – and this was built and enhanced 
in the 1630s. Thanks to these changes, movements of 
ships became more predictable and the details of the 
system could be more accurately forecast. The 
mentioned change of handling and acquiring of 
navigational knowledge fits in this picture perfectly. 
Van  Dyke’s  (1997)  example  for  this  is  bookkeeping,  but  
several other, at first glance not necessarily related 
aspect of this change can be traced. The transformation 
of the mapmaking practices of the Company I detailed 
in this paper is one of them. It was not only – and 
maybe not even primarily – a question of quantity. The 
first maps created in Asia can be dated to the early 
1620s and showed mainly zones of military importance. 
The situation, as the case of Japan shows, changed 
dramatically in the next decade. Several other – less 
striking – indicators and aspects of this change can also 
be highlighted. One is the movement from tacit 
knowledge towards the use of more objective, more 
material,  more  exterior  “containers”.  And  if  we  focus  on  
an even more general level, especial emphasis was put 
on systematic collection of data, which seems to 
indicate an altered mentality. That is, the topic of this 
paper should be handled not as a separate phenomenon, 
should not be treated in itself but as a part of a bigger 
transformation, as the rearrangement of the information 
patterns – and within this: the infrastructure – of the 
VOC. 
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